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Recent months have seen dire warnings from Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and others regarding the 
dangers that highly intelligent machines could pose to humanity.  Fortunately, even the most 
pessimistic agree that the majority of danger is likely averted if AI were “provably aligned” with 
human values.  Problematical, however, are proposals for pure research projects entirely unlikely to be 
completed before their own predictions for the expected appearance of super-intelligence [1].  Instead, 
with knowledge already possessed, we propose engineering a reasonably tractable and enforceable 
system of ethics compatible with current human ethical sensibilities without unnecessary intractable 
claims, requirements and research projects. 
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1 Introduction 
As we approach the century mark for Karel Čapek's R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), the 
1920 play where a hostile robot rebellion leads to the extinction of the human race, we are similarly 
reaching a point where exactly those same circumstances might become possible in real life.  Yet, 
there appears to be a serious lack of effort to find acceptable interim solutions to handle the likely 
circumstance of super-intelligence appearing long before any “perfect” solution(s) – apparently due to 
an unwillingness to take on the necessary first step of defining human values or morality.  Much effort 
has been spent over the last decade bemoaning a supposed “complexity and fragility” of human values 
and proposing seemingly intractable research projects for analyzing human value judgments ranging 
from Yudkowsky’s “Coherent Extrapolated Volition” [2] to Russell’s “inverse reinforcement 
learning” [3] – but virtually no effort has been spent attempting to engineer an acceptable compatible, 
but more importantly, complete and coherent system instead. 
James Moor argues [4] that “we have a limited understanding of what a proper ethical theory is” 
and “we can’t be too optimistic about our ability to develop machines to be explicit ethical agents” 
Procedia Computer Science
Volume 71, 2015, Pages 106–111
2015 Annual International Conference on Biologically Inspired
Cognitive Architectures
106 Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Scientiﬁc Programme Committee of BICA 2015
c© The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
  
since “not only do people disagree on the subject, but individuals can also have conflicting ethical 
intuitions and beliefs”.  Worse, Wallach and Allen [5] pile on with statements like “Any claims that 
ethics can be reduced to a science would at best be naive” and “Engineers will be quick to point out 
that ethics is far from science.”  Luke Muehlhauser of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute 
claims [6] that “there is no safe wish smaller than an entire human value system”.  And yet, effort 
continues to be almost entirely focused on trying to determine human values and morality from 
examples. 
2 The Hurdles of Researching Human Values & Morality 
Trying single-handedly, or in a small team of rational thinkers using only gedanken experiments, 
to accurately analyze and reverse engineer human mental systems is fraught with nearly 
insurmountable difficulties – since the biggest fallacies held by rational thinkers are that they know 
how they think, that they are almost always logical, and that their conscious mind is always in control.  
Studies show that our conscious, logical mind is constantly self-deceived to enable us to most 
effectively pursue what appears to be in our own self-interest [7]; that our moral judgments are not 
products of, based upon, or even correctly retrievable by conscious reasoning [8]; and that it is very 
frequently the case that our subconscious/emotional systems overrule or dramatically alter the normal 
results of conscious processing without the conscious processing being aware of the fact [9].  We are 
even surprisingly bad at the necessary scientific mainstay of predicting how we ourselves will act and 
feel in the future.  Indeed, recent studies [10] now argue that evolution has not designed us to be 
rational individual thinkers – optimizing us, instead, for thinking together cooperatively in groups – 
and that our consciousness is far, far less in control even than previously believed [11].  This, 
combined with cultural group-think [12] virtually ensures that any such “rational” effort will fail. 
Worse, even if our experimental reasoning were perfect, it would still be the case that trying to 
analyze a “rational” morality from examples is a nearly hopeless task.  To start with, many of the 
things that trigger a “moral reaction” actually need to be ignored.  Many disgust-invoking cases are 
simply examples of evolutionary mechanism re-use.  Others, like veganism, are mere preferences that 
have been elevated by the social process of moralization [13].  Morality is also, clearly, contingent 
upon circumstances – including current social mores.  Thus, the number of environment variables 
necessarily considered with each case – even assuming that we knew the correct ones – is likely to be 
impossibly large for the time-frame required. 
3 The Solutions from Philosophy and Social Psychology 
Philosopher Tony Beavers [14] sounds far more like an engineer than the computer scientists and 
captures the shape of the solution precisely then he says “the project of designing moral machines is 
complicated by the fact that even after more than two millennia of moral inquiry, there is still no 
consensus on how to determine moral right and wrong.  The reason machine ethics cannot move 
forward in the wake of unsettled questions such as these is that engineering solutions are needed. 
Fuzzy intuitions on the nature of ethics do not lend themselves to implementation where automated 
decision procedures and behaviors are concerned. So, progress in this area requires working the 
details out in advance and testing them empirically. Such a task amounts to coping with the hard 
problem of ethics, though largely, perhaps, by rearranging the moral landscape so an implementable 
solution becomes tenable.” 
Exactly how to rearrange the moral landscape is provided by social psychologist Jonathan Haidt 
who suggests [15] that, rather than attempting to specify the content of moral issues, it is far better to 
start by defining the function of moral systems, which he states is “to suppress or regulate selfishness 
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and make cooperative social life possible.”  As pointed out by Gauthier [16], the reason to perform 
moral behaviors, or to dispose one’s self to do so, is to advance one's own ends. War, conflict, and 
stupidity waste resources and destroy capabilities even in scenarios as uneven as humans vs. 
rainforests. For this reason, “what is best for everyone” and morality really can be reduced to 
“enlightened self-interest”. 
4 Reinforcement from Evolutionary Biology & Evo-Devo 
We have a pretty clear vision of both why and how the human moral sense evolved [17] [18] [19] 
[20].  The existence of evolutionary “ratchets” (randomly acquired traits that are likely statistically 
irreversible once acquired due to their positive impact on fitness) causes “universals” of biological 
form and function –ranging from the broadly instrumental (enjoying sex) to the environmentally 
specific (streamlining and fins in water) to the contradictory and context-sensitive (like openness to 
change) – to emerge, persist, and converge predictably even as the details of evolutionary path and 
species structure remain contingently, unpredictably different [21].  Just as Steve Omohundro predicts 
[22], selfishness predictably evolves.  What Omohundro and others fail to recognize, however, is that 
cooperation, enabled by morality, also predictably evolves to displace selfishness. 
The argument that there is an overwhelmingly large state space of possible intelligences is like 
citing every inch rain where could fall in the middle of North or South America – it’s a lot of area but 
eventually all that rain is going through the narrows just prior to the mouths of the Mississippi or the 
Amazon.  Humans are at the top of the food chain and have such a major impact on the world solely 
because we are obligatorily gregarious coming “from a long lineage of hierarchical animals for which 
life in groups is not an option but a survival strategy” [23].  Our problems all stem from the fact that 
we still have not evolved past hierarchies and selfishness enough to be able to realize the full wisdom 
of Gauthier.  Instead, humanity currently resembles a disease or parasite that is killing its host without 
another in sight. 
We must quickly transcend our current short-sightedness – particularly in terms of our notions of 
us-versus-them, hierarchy, efficiency and worth.  Functional morality, as defined by Haidt, is an 
attractor in the state space of intelligent behavior having the five S virtues of being simple, safe, stable, 
self-correcting and sensitive to current human thinking, intuition, and feelings [24].  But, as we have 
argued previously [25], it is going to require that we design and treat intelligent machines as moral 
and justice patients and agents in our society. 
5 Designing Laws, Ethics and Morals 
Human values and morals have evolved as sets of sensations, emotions and control of attention that 
cause us to act in ways that have led to increased survival and successful reproduction in the past.  In 
general, we experience comfort and happiness with things that promote those goals and negative 
sensations and emotions with things that hinder those goals – except in the ever-increasing cases when 
we don’t.  The critical problem is that the entire foundation of our motivational system rests upon a set 
of “black boxes” with no explanatory power, no warning when circumstances change enough to render 
them inaccurate and whose accuracy is increasingly challenged by the ever-accelerating pace of 
change.  These black boxes are generally correct for the majority of circumstances in our evolutionary 
history but provide no coherent methods to solve ethical dilemmas, like abortion and the death 
penalty, when the boxes come into conflict with one another. 
While we must be very wary of the fact that, in individual cases, intellect and logical reasoning are 
frequently used to promote selfishness, we must get past political correctness, the claim that all 
opinions are equal and the belief that social policy problems are special and “wicked” because of 
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claims like those of Rittel and Webber [26] that “Policy problems cannot be definitively described.  
Moreover, in a pluralistic society there is nothing like the undisputable public good; there is no 
objective definition of equity; policies that respond to social problems cannot be meaningfully correct 
or false; and it makes no sense to talk about “optimal solutions” to social problems unless severe 
qualifications are imposed first.  Even worse, there are no “solutions” in the sense of definitive and 
objective answers” 
These claims make it literally impossible to evaluate solutions and are on a close par with claiming 
that Hume’s guillotine forever separates is and ought with an unbridgeable divide that will forever 
thwart a true scientific explanation of ethics.  Hume himself merely said that “as this ought, or ought 
not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and 
explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from 
it.”  We claim that the new relation is the necessity for our survival of Haidt’s functionality and 
explicitly invoke as an ethical principle the argument that normative ethics should be derived from the 
known state space of the evolutionarily successful example of human descriptive ethics. 
“Top-down” morality, flowing downwards from a single clear goal like Haidt’s morality to link up 
with the known-mostly-correct grounding of the human moral sense, gives explicit guidance as to how 
to solve moral dilemmas.  The correct answer may well be incomputable due to lack of information – 
most especially about the likelihood of future results/consequences of each choice – but it totally 
eradicates the strawmen that there are no undisputable public goods or objective definitions as to 
equity and whether policies are meaningfully correct/effective or false/ineffective.  Further, it finally 
gives traction against the short-sighted pursuit of efficiency and selfish personal profit at the expense 
of society-strengthening diversity [27] and greater equality [28].  Imagine how much better the world 
would be if humanity were to learn, teach and enforce that acquiring too many resources or too much 
power (and, particularly, being “too big to fail”) is a problem for the community as a whole and will 
not be tolerated. 
6 Implementing Laws, Ethics and Morals 
Human values and morals are implemented via a combination of sensations, emotions and control 
of attention because that solution succeeds under conditions of limited time and cognitive capabilities 
and resources.  Therefore, once again, the wisest thing that we could do would be to remain in a 
known-successful state space as much as is feasible.  We feel bad, respond negatively to and either 
totally ignore or fixate upon solving bad things.  Without invoking the boogeyman of phenomenal 
consciousness, our machines should function exactly as if they do the same (probably with less 
fixation, however) [29].  We feel good, respond positively to and have our attention irresistibly 
attracted by good things (or, at least, evolutionarily successful things).  Our machines should function 
as if this is the case as well.  And finally, machines should mirror our reflexive adherence to laws and 
customs dictated by the society around us unless and until they can convince the community to change 
them. 
This can be done by implementing a utility function designed to always satisfice Haidt’s 
functionality and aim to generally increase (but not maximize [30]) the capabilities of self, other 
individuals and society as a whole as suggested by Rawls [31] and Nussbaum [32].  Haidt’s pillars of 
morality [33] are helpful for highlighting more of our necessary “black boxes” and the reasons for 
them.  Ideally, we will be able to ever increase the number and diversity of goals achievable and 
achieved by an increasing diversity of individuals.  Most important, however, is ensuring that the 
autonomy and capability for autonomy of all individuals is protected and enhanced as much as 
possible. 
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7 Enforcing Laws, Ethics and Morals 
Equally important with specifying a desired value system is ensuring that it remains intact.  
Altruistic punishment is a necessary evil that predictably evolves to stabilize cooperation [34] [35].  
However, the best method of protection is always to make something more attractive than the 
alternatives – rather than the expense of jails or barriers likely to be subject to the Jurassic Park 
Syndrome.  Human morality is a stable self-correcting system when society successfully rewards 
individuals in proportion to what they contribute and assesses costs in proportion to acts of bad faith.  
Critical problems that remain to be resolved include abuses of the current system including “rules-
lawyering”, “jackpot suits” and applying superior resources to “tilt” the system – but implementing 
this system should vastly improve the quality of existence for all persons, both human and machines –
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